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Carrie Menkel-Meadow* UNSETTLING THE LAWYERS: OTHER
FORMS OF JUSTICE IN INDIGENOUS
CLAIMS OF EXPROPRIATION,
ABUSE, AND INJUSTICE†
This article considers, from the experience of the Indian Residential Schools Settle-
ment, the limitations of the current formal justice system and the common ways that
lawyers and parties act within it. Looking at the combinations of lawsuits, settle-
ment negotiations, structured compensation schemes, truth and reconciliation pro-
cesses, and memorial and education programs now provided for in the IRSS, the
article suggests that we may need ‘process pluralism’ and different orientations to
deal with modern mass harms: now recognized harms (like loss of culture, family,
language, as well as physical, mental, and social injury) that the formal legal sys-
tem has not yet developed the capacity to address. Placing the IRSS in a larger inter-
national context, the article suggests that some legal and social recognition of ‘new’
human harms and injuries has necessitated the development of different legal and
quasi-legal processes. Whether called ‘restorative,’ ‘transitional,’ or ‘alternative’ jus-
tice, new forms of dealing with wrongs, harms, and conflicts will require redesign-
ing legal processes and institutions; legal professional education; and social,
cultural, and philosophical orientations to human injuries and ‘redress.’ Not all
who are injured (both individually and in groups) want or require the same ‘reme-
dies,’ and our conventional and historical common law and adversarial system
must be adapted to the diverse needs of those who are injured by past and unconscio-
nable wrongs, especially when inflicted by major governmental, religious, and civil
society institutions and practices.
Keywords: transitional justice, restorative justice, alternative dispute resolu-
tion, legal process, legal profession, legal education
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later.
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I Introduction: Unsettling the lawyers –What process for what injustice?
What role can the legal profession, law, and legal processes play in the
search for justice, reconciliation, and restoration of humanity after great
(mass) harm has been done? This is a question faced by any lawyer in
human rights, personal injury, civil and constitutional rights, criminal,
discrimination, and international law. The twentieth century and the le-
gacies of nineteenth (and earlier) centuries of colonization, genocides,
expropriations of land, culture, homes, bodies, souls, and human dignity
have now forced us to reconceive how we deal with the past (in the pres-
ent and for the future) when harm has been caused, not only to indivi-
duals, but to whole groups of people, in numbers that challenge our
western legal conceptions of individualism and in content that chal-
lenges our conceptions of what wrongs or injustice consist of. To what
extent must conventional legal processes (lawsuits, judgments, damage
awards, and injunctions) expand or give way to include a different set of
processes and remedies for the recognition and acknowledgement
of harm and hurt, where full restitution or compensation cannot be
made, where injured victims1 cannot be ‘made whole’ in the conven-
tional way our (Anglo-American-Canadian) adversarial system provides
for? What can lawyers contribute to alternative legal processes to attempt
to deal with (if not right) the wrongs that have been done to others,
especially as conceptions of right and wrong are themselves changeable
over time?
In the present article, I hope to draw on my life’s work as a process
pluralist2 both to commend the Canadian Indian Residential Schools
Settlement for its attempt to provide models of different processes to
deal with a gross and mass injustice done to the Indigenous peoples of
Canada and to reflect on what this process might teach us about how
1 I use scare quotes for ‘victims’ because the concept of ‘victimhood’ in restorative jus-
tice work is itself controversial. Some see anyone who has been hurt by mass atrocities
as ‘victims’; others say there was no ‘intent’ to treat some people badly at some point
in time when theories of behaviour were different (theories of colonization and ‘civi-
lizing’; others don’t want to be labelled ‘victims’ for the connotation of passivity and
acceptance of hurt and harm. So, I use scare quotes to signal that most of the termi-
nology in the fields of restorative and transitional justice are themselves contested.
See e.g. Margaret Kohn & Keally McBride, Political Theories of Decolonization: Postcoloni-
alism and the Problem of Foundations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Andrew
Woolford & RS Ratner, Informal Reckonings: Conflict Resolution in Mediation, Restorative
Justice and Reparations (New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2008).
2 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Peace and Justice: Notes on the Evolution and Purposes
of Plural Legal Processes’ (2006) 94 Geo LJ 553.
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legal processes and lawyers must be able to reconceive how they attempt
to achieve justice in situations, like this, when great wrongs are done to
many. It is my view (and argument) that current legal institutions and
legal education are inadequate to deal with more modern recognition of
different claims of value and loss (e.g., loss of culture, loss of homeland,
loss of language, loss of family, and intergenerational injustice) and
more diverse claims for justice, restoration, reparation, or restitution,
after great harm has been done. The Indian Residential Schools Settle-
ment is one illustration of how conventional legal processes (individual
lawsuits, class actions) in a variety of different levels of courts and juris-
dictions evolved into national, regional, and local sets of processes to
attempt to deal with personal and group harms by drawing on both con-
ventional legal processes (lawsuits, discovery, negotiations and settle-
ment, compensation) and more modern (and local and Indigenous)
processes of restorative justice, through truth and reconciliation pro-
cesses, testimonies, apologies, commemoration, and ongoing care and
counselling. My hope here is to spur us on to reconceive the role of the
lawyer in designing more tailored or ‘bespoke’3 processes and institu-
tions for the necessary processes of recognizing, taking responsibility for,
and apologizing for past wrongs, while at the same time, focusing on
more complex remedies for moving from the past to the future,4 includ-
ing compensation, apologies, and affirmative action to improve and
repair the lives of those who suffer from the legacies of great harm. This
must, in my view, include both victims and perpetrators (or their descen-
dants)—in current terminology, both the ‘settlers’ and those who were
here ‘first’—as we now must live together with our histories and our fu-
tures.5
3 See Jaya Ramji-Nogales, ‘Designing Bespoke Transitional Justice: A Pluralist Process
Approach’ (2010/1) 32 Mich J Int’l L 1.
4 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Remembrance of Things Past? The Relationship of Past
to Future in Pursuing Justice in Mediation’ (2004) 5 Cardozo Journal of Conflict Reso-
lution 97.
5 Claims of land acquisition through ‘conquest’ have dominated western conceptions
of property and sovereignty throughout the colonial period (and earlier) but are
largely contested by Indigenous peoples throughout the world. Modern legal theory
has questioned these conceptions intellectually, but this has not solved the problems
of actual co-existence in a wide variety of modern territories, e.g. Canada, Australia,
the United States, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Israel, Palestine,
Turkey, Iraq (Kurdistan), much of the Middle East and large parts of Asia and Africa,
as well. What makes a territory or a people sovereign? See Joseph Singer, Property Law:
Rules, Policies and Practices, 5th ed (New York: Wolters Kluwer Aspen Law and Business,
2010).
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As many now write about ‘unsettling’ the settlers (whether Canadian,6
Australian,7 American,8 British,9 French, or other colonizers) so they
take responsibility for what they or their ancestors have done to the origi-
nal inhabitants of the lands they conquered or settled, I want here to
unsettle the lawyers about how they (we) deal with these past injustices –
old methods of lawsuits, trials, and affixing (through the legal necessity
of individualized proof) of blame may not be adequate to repair the
harms that have been done in the past, if we who inhabit these lands in
the present hope to live together, more reconciled to our future shared
fates.
II The past: Claims for harms and injuries
Other articles in this issue10 more fully recount the history of the Indian
Residential Schools litigation and settlement in Canada. Here, I just want
6 Paulette Regan, Unsettling the Settler Within: Indian Residential Schools, Truth Telling, and
Reconciliation in Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010)
[Regan].
7 Sarah Maddison & Morgan Brigg, Unsettling the Settler State: Creativity and Resistance in
Indigenous Settler-State Governance (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2011) [Maddison &
Brigg].
8 David Wallace Adams, Education for Extinction (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press,
1995).
9 Oranges and Sunshine, directed by Jim Loach (See Saw Films / Sixteen Films, 2010):
this film depicts a slightly different form of cruelty – thousands of British children, or-
phans, foster care children, were forcibly ‘deported’ to Australia and Canada in the
1950s and 1960s and often abused and forced to work, while being deprived of their
families and homeland. A dedicated British social worker, Margaret Humphries, dis-
covered this practice and has worked tirelessly to both reunite families and seek justice
for the children, now grown, who have suffered from this modern form of dislocation.
A more recent film, Philomena, directed by Stephen Frears (IMBdPro, 2013), depicts
the cruelty of the church in separating children from their unwed mothers in England
and using forced adoption to send the children to other countries, including the
United States. The modern interest in these stories and films demonstrates a growing
awareness of the wrongs done, including loss of family, and so forth, and the role of
the state and otherwise ‘charitable’ and religious organizations in perpetrating such
wrongs. There is a confluence here of recognition and interest in these cases and the
abandonment in more recent times of legal doctrines of immunity that shielded the
wrongdoers from responsibility and liability; see e.g. Mayo Moran, ‘The Role of Repar-
ative Justice in Responding to the Legacy of the Indian Residential Schools’ (2014)
64:4 UTLJ [present issue] [Moran].
10 See Moran, ibid; John Borrows, ‘Residential Schools, Respect, and Responsibilities for
Past Harms’ (2014) 64:4 UTLJ [present issue]; Kent Roach, ‘Blaming the Victim:
Canadian Law, Causation, and Residential Schools’ (2014) 64:4 UTLJ [present issue]
[Roach]; Kathleen Mahoney, ‘The Settlement Process: A Personal Reflection’ (2014)
64:4 UTLJ [present issue] [Mahoney].
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to set forth briefly the larger legal context in which this litigation and set-
tlement is now globally located. In many respects, one can think of
the twentieth century as the culmination of several centuries of struggle
over the formal and legal recognition of international human rights,11 as
the horrors of World Wars I and II and the Nazi genocide issued in the
Nuremberg Trials and the United Nations Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in the late 1940s, to be followed by many more formal
treaties and declarations (e.g. the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (1967), the Genocide Convention (1948), the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(1979), and the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(2007)); and then formal adjudicative institutions to accept claims, adju-
dicate, and order remedies (both criminal and civil) for human rights
violations (e.g. European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, the International Criminal Tribunal for the For-
mer Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Court). In another
important legal development, modern human rights law now grants indi-
viduals (and sometimes non-governmental and other organizations)
standing to sue, where formerly only nation states could be party to inter-
national claims of rights violations. As a result of this expanded recogni-
tion of juridical entities with rights to sue (and be sued), Indigenous
groups have now been mobilized to sue on behalf of themselves, their
peoples, and their land in international, national, regional, local, and
even private and quasi-private tribunals (e.g. international investment
arbitration) for claims involving human rights, property, and other cul-
tural and resource expropriation.12
In the last two centuries, nations have also increasingly recognized
new human and civil rights in their own constitutions, beginning with
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, the
United States Bill of Rights (amendments to the 1789 US Constitution),
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), and the many
new constitutions of the new nations of the postcolonial era and those
formed after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet
Union.13 Some nations, like Argentina,14 formally adopt recognition of
11 See Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (New York: WW Norton, 2007);
Henry Steiner, Ryan Goodman, & Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context:
Law, Politics and Morals, 3d ed (New York: Oxford Press, 2007).
12 See e.g. Christopher Whytock, ‘Some Cautionary Notes on the Chevronization of
Transnational Litigation’ (2013) 1 Stanford Journal of Complex Litigation 467.
13 See e.g. Vicki Jackson & Mark Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law, 3d ed ( New
York: Foundation Press, 2014).
14 Argentina Constitution, (1994), art 22, incorporating international human rights trea-
ties as part of the constitution.
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international human rights obligations in their own constitutions; other
nations, even without formal written constitutions (e.g. the United King-
dom and Israel), recognize human and civil rights to be adjudicated in
their national courts.15
In addition to the formal recognition of genocide, torture, slavery, dis-
crimination, and other mass atrocities in courts of law, the twentieth cen-
tury has also produced legal recognition of civil claims for ‘mass torts,’
often but not always brought as class actions, when large groups of indivi-
duals or discrete groups of peoples have been collectively (and indivi-
dually) harmed in accidents, intentional or not (both natural16 and
man-made disasters17), terrorist attacks,18 by products (e.g. asbestos,19
medical devices, treatments or drugs20) or other forms of collective mal-
feasance. Collective or class actions, in American law, were not originally
intended (under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) to
apply to individually suffered harms and hurts (where it was thought
that injuries would be more individualized21), but for decades now,
groups of people harmed similarly by known defendants can bring
claims for injunctions, damages, and other forms of relief (e.g. medical
monitoring in health cases) in a collective action, a legal practice now re-
cognized in other parts of the world, including Canada.22
So, in the last few decades, both individuals and groups of people have
sued in domestic, international, and even private (arbitration) tribunals
for both civil (damages and injunctions) and criminal remedies (impri-
sonments, punishment, fines, etc). Modern legal claims include demands
for compensation for lost lives, limbs, health, property, wages, consor-
tium, dignitary rights, pain and suffering, emotional harm, torture,
15 See e.g. Aharon Barak & Erin Daly, Dignity Rights: Courts, Constitutions and the Worth of
the Human Person (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012).
16 Gerald Stern, The Buffalo Creek Disaster: How the Survivors of One of the Worst Disasters in
Coal Mining History Brought Suit (New York: Vintage, 1977).
17 Jonathan Haar, A Civil Action (New York: Vintage, 1996).
18 Kenneth Feinberg, What’s a Life Worth? (New York: Public Affairs Press, 2006).
19 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘The Ethics of Mass Torts Settlements: When the Rules Meet
the Road’ (1995) 80 Cornell L Rev 1159.
20 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Taking the Mass Out of Mass Torts: Reflections of a Dalkon
Shield Arbitrator on Alternative Dispute Resolution, Judging, Neutrality, Gender and
Process’ (1998) 31 Loy LA L Rev 513.
21 See e.g. Deborah Hensler, ‘A Glass Half Full, A Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation’ (1995) 73 Tex L Rev 1587;
Francis McGovern, ‘Settlement of Mass Torts in a Federal System’ (2001) 36 Wake
Forest L Rev 871; Jack B Weinstein, Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation: The Effect of
Class Actions, Consolidations, and Other Multiparty Devices (Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, 1995).
22 See e.g. Garry Watson, ‘Class Actions: The Canadian Experience’ (2001) 11 Duke J of
Comp & Int’l Law 269.
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opportunity costs, and more recently, for such things as group harms
and collective losses. Modern litigation has produced some more mod-
ern remedies in the form of medical monitoring and treatment for some
health claims, injunctions to monitor organizational compliance with
discrimination claims or monitor prison conditions,23 ‘coupons’ and
new forms of economic compensation for some consumer and anti-trust
claims as well as the controversial affirmative actions of setting goals and
quotas for job hiring and promotion or other benefits in both private
and public settings. The Indian Residential Schools litigation has been
significant for many reasons, but among those reasons are newly stated
claims for loss of language, loss of culture, and the intergenerational
harm that have come from the forced displacement of children away
from their parental homes, raising important questions about what
claims can or should be recognized in courts.24
The claims brought by former residents of Indian Residential Schools
in Canada were brought both individually and collectively as class actions
for claims of abuse (physical, mental, and sexual) and of loss of home,
culture, language, and family over a period of years. In Canada, Austra-
lia, and the United States (my own country has not yet formally apolo-
gized or taken any formal action with respect to similar claims), Indian
children were removed from their homes, beginning in the seventeenth
century and continuing until well into the present.25 In my own country,
for example, it is estimated that the peak year for enrolment in Indian
boarding schools was 1973, when an estimated 60 000 children remained
in such schools.26 The justifying ideology of such schools was the claim
that Natives or Indigenous people needed to be ‘civilized.’ As early as
23 See e.g. Susan Sturm, ‘Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial Inter-
vention in Prisons’ (1990) 138 U Pa L Rev 807; Margo Schlanger, ‘The Politics of
Inmate Litigation’ (2004) 117 Harv L Rev 2799.
24 Jennifer Llewellyn, ‘Dealing with the Legacy of Native Residential School Abuse in
Canada: Litigation, ADR and Restorative Justice’ (2002) 52 UTLJ 253; Zoe Oxaal, ‘Re-
moving That Which Was Indian from the Plaintiff: Tort Recovery for Loss of Lan-
guage and Culture in Indian Residential Schools Litigation’ (2005) 68 Sask L Rev 367;
See also Jeffrey Alexander, Ron Eyerman et al, Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). This, of course, implicates the impor-
tant jurisprudential question in common law systems of how new legal claims are ar-
ticulated by claimants and lawyers and when they are recognized by judges and courts,
creating new legal causes of action through the common law. See e.g. Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr, The Common Law (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press); John Noonan, Persons
and Masks of the Law (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
25 In Canada, the last residential Indian school operated by the government was closed
in 1996. There remain only a few residential or boarding schools in either Canada or
the United States and they are now often operated by Indigenous peoples themselves.
26 ‘American Indian Boarding Schools’ (25 March 2014) [Boarding Schools] online: Wi-
kipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Indian_boarding_schools>.
626 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL
(2014) 64 UTLJ © UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS DOI: 10.3138/utlj.2418
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2495539
1634, Fr Andrew White of the Society of Jesus established a mission to
‘extend civilization and instruction to this ignorant race and show them
the way to heaven.’27 While both Harvard College (as early as 1665) and
later Dartmouth College admitted Indigenous students to their colleges
for education along with the colonists in the East, later schools in the
Western regions of the colonies were initially founded by missionaries.
Thus, modern litigants have sued both governmental bodies and a vari-
ety of Protestant and Catholic churches that established schools in the
name of ‘civilizing’ the local ‘savages.’ Reflecting typical comments of
the time, a United States Army officer, Richard Henry Pratt, is reported
to have said famously, in 1892 (serving as a model for policies developed
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs): ‘A great general has said that the only
good Indian is a dead one. In a sense, I agree with the sentiment, but
only in this: that all the Indian there is in the race should be dead. Kill
the Indian in him and save the man.’28 Pratt developed a policy of assim-
ilation ‘through total immersion.’29 Curricula in Indian boarding or resi-
dential schools depended on learning English and English/American/
Canadian/Australian history and culture and silencing and prohibiting
all use of Native languages and practices. Long hair was cut; religious or
tribal customs were prohibited and severely punished, often with harsh
physical discipline. Physical conditions in the schools themselves were
substandard, deficient in sanitary and heating and other health condi-
tions. The modern lawsuits also alleged (and proved) sexual assault on
both male and female students as well as harsh corporal punishment
and mental degradation and anguish. Compulsory conversion to Chris-
tianity was part of most schools, whether religiously or governmentally
funded and managed. In the early 1920s and 1930s, some government
reports indicated there were infectious disease (including tuberculosis
and other communicable diseases) and physical and mental abuse, and
the first demands of activists and some government officials that the
schools be reformed or eliminated began.
In Canada, the residential schools for First Nations (including Métis,
Inuit, and other groups) were funded by the Canadian government’s
Department of Indian Affairs but mostly administered by Christian
27 Henry Foley, Records of the English Province of the Society of Jesus (London: Burns and
Oates, 1878) at 352, online: Internet Archive <http://archive.org/details/recordso
fenglish00fole#page>.
28 Cited in Charla Bear, ‘American Indian Boarding Schools Haunt Many’ (12 May
2008), online: National Public Radio <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.
php?storyId=16516865>; see also Andrea Smith, ‘Soul Wound: The Legacy of Native
American Schools,’ Amnesty International Magazine (26 March 2007), online: <http://
www.amnestyusa.org/node/87342>.
29 Cited in Boarding Schools, supra note 26.
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churches. Attendance at a day industrial or residential school for First
Nations children was mandatory and often enforced by compulsory
assignment to a residential school, especially, but not exclusively, in
more rural regions. Estimates range, but suggest that close to 150 000
students passed through these schools before they were closed in the
1990s.30 In addition to claims of abuse within the institutions themselves,
modern lawsuits also made claims for the ‘intergenerational harms’ of
higher rates of alcoholism, drug use, and domestic violence within com-
munities in which family and Indigenous social structures were de-
stroyed and disrupted by the effects of compulsory removal to residential
schools. The media brought attention to this issue in a variety of ways,
aided by the efforts of the litigation lawyers representing victims and the
courageous actions taken by First Nations victims of these schools, as well
as by some documentary films and published narratives, children’s stor-
ies, novels, and plays.31
In an important, but seen by many still to be a purely ‘symbolic’ act,
Prime Minister Stephen Harper publicly apologized in Parliament on 11
June 2008 on behalf of the Canadian government for this long-standing
policy, following on from a March 1998 Statement of Reconciliation is-
sued by the government for those who were sexually or physically
abused. The government established an Aboriginal Healing Foundation
and allocated some $350 million to fund community-based healing pro-
grams. In 2003, in response to both lawsuits and increasing publicity
about the schools and their legacy, the government launched an alterna-
tive dispute resolution (ADR) process for compensation and psychologi-
cal support for those who could prove some form of physical or sexual
abuse or other conditions of ‘wrongful confinement.’32 The ADR pro-
cess was itself quite controversial: there were claims that the high stan-
dard of proof demanded for particular claims did not address all the
actual experiences of harm, differences in awards, and arguments that
the government used this process to obtain ‘legal certainty and closure’
and not to fully acknowledge Indigenous demands for apologies and
30 ‘Canadian Indian Residential School System’ (26 March 2014), online: <http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Canadian_Indian_residential_school_system>.
31 See e.g. The Mission School Syndrome, written by Vic Istchenko & Jim Atkinson (North-
ern Native Broadcasting, 1985); Where the Spirit Lives, directed by Bruce Pittman
(Screen Door, 1989); Beyond the Shadows, directed by Peter Von Puttkamer (Gryphon
Productions, 1993); Stolen Children (CBC Learning, 2008); Shirley Sterling, My Name is
Seepeetza (Toronto: Groundwood Books; House of Anansi Press, 1992); Sylvia Olsen,
No Time to Say Goodbye: Children’s Stories of Kuper Island Residential School (Victoria, BC:
Sono Nis Press, 2001).
32 Regan, supra note 6 at 111–42.
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other kinds of reparations. Kathleen Mahoney, in this issue,33 describes
in greater detail how inadequate the ADR process was, risking re-
victimizing claimants and giving the lie to the meaning and ideology
behind alternative dispute resolution processes which are intended to be
more, not less, sensitive to people’s needs when they are making claims
such as these.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission born out of the Indian
Schools Settlement, discussed more fully below, documented deaths, dis-
ease, forced sterilizations, sexual abuse, corporal and harsh punish-
ments, inadequate and poorly heated facilities, poor sanitation,
inadequate education, and some forced labour, particularly agricultural
work. In Canada, some of the government reports issued in the 1940s cri-
ticized much Indian policy and eliminated some of the compulsory poli-
cies, but existing schools remained underfunded and lawsuits have
demonstrated that abuse continued well into the 1990s. As more fully re-
ported in other articles in this issue and in the full report of the Indian
Residential Schools Settlement,34 a serious of successful lawsuits led to
large monetary payments of damages from the Canadian government
and from the major churches (Catholic, Anglican, United Church, and
Presbyterian) which administered and ran the schools. Settlement talks
began in the early 2000s, as some feared the lawsuits might actually bank-
rupt the Canadian government and cause serious financial difficulties
for the churches.
In stories and reports featured at this conference, Assessing Canada’s
Indian Residential Schools Litigation and Settlement Processes, we
learned how activist National Chief Phil Fontaine, representatives of the
Ministry of Justice, and government mediators met with the lawyers, clai-
mants, and representatives of First Nations, churches, and government
bodies in a series of mediated meetings to arrive at what is still the largest
(in dollars) settlement of a claim against the Canadian government. The
Indian Residential Schools Settlement provided for $5 billion dollars35
in total allocation for
• ‘common experience payments’ to be paid to all former students who
resided in a school;
• an independent assessment process for individualized claims of sexual,
physical, or other abuse;
33 Mahoney, supra note 10.
34 Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement (May 2006), online: <http://www.residen
tialschoolsettlement.ca/settlement.html>.
35 Fact Sheet: Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement (last updated 1 January
2014), online: Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada <https://www.
aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1332949137290/1332949312397>.
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• a truth and reconciliation commission, mandated to hold seven
national events, create a public historical record, and provide aware-
ness about the school system and its impact;
• a commemoration initiative, with an allocation of $20 million to sup-
port local, regional, and national activities to honour, remember,
memorialize, and pay tribute to former students, their families, and
communities; and
• other measures to support healing, through the Aboriginal Healing
Funds and Indian Residential Schools Resolution Health Support Pro-
gram.36
This settlement began to operate on 19 September 2007, after
approval by the participating parties and relevant courts.
While the motivations to come to a mediation table and seek negotia-
tion and settlement of such mass injustices are many and vary among the
parties who choose to participate in such events (and we can never really
know them all, especially in a confidential process, often protected by
formal undertakings of secrecy and confidentiality, whether by contract,
legislation, or informal agreement), the fact that so many diverse actors
came together to forge this multi-faceted settlement of compensation,
apology, hearings, ceremonies, documentation, truth telling, commemo-
ration, treatment, and healing is historically important and significant,
not only for Canada and its many peoples, but for what this process
might teach others who suffer similar group-focused but individually suf-
fered injuries.37
What lessons can we learn from what we do know about the processes
and ultimate settlement of these grievous wrongs? What can lawyers and
the legal system bring to these issues? What might lawyers and legal sys-
tems learn from what has been accomplished here?
36 Ibid.
37 It is my view, based on my current research and scholarly work – e.g. Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Cultural Variations in Restorative Justice [unpublished] – that these mass
harms are not similar to each other at all but, indeed, pain, death, suffering, torture,
discrimination, abuse, and so forth and reactions to them are quite culturally diverse.
Efforts to create new forms of restorative justice must be culturally sensitive to the par-
ticular historical and cultural facts on the ground, but we can still learn about how to
structure such processes from all that have gone before; see e.g. Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, ‘Restorative Justice: What Is It and Does It Work?’ (2007) 3 Annual Review
of Law and Social Science 161; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Are There Systemic Ethics Is-
sues in Dispute System Design? And What We Should (Not) Do about It: Lessons from
International and Domestic Fronts’ (2009) 14 Harvard Negot L Rev 195; Priscilla Hay-
ner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions, 2d ed
(New York: Routledge, 2010) [Hayner]; Erin Daly & Jeremy Sarkin, Reconciliation in Di-
vided Societies: Finding Common Ground (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania,
2010).
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III The present and future: Restorative, reconciliative,
and transitional justice as additions to legal justice
Make no mistake about it, conventional litigation strategies were, in
my view, absolutely essential for some rectification of the Indian Residen-
tial Schools harms and claims. It is also my view that they alone should
not be the sole or even primary way of attempting to ‘resolve’ (or as
I prefer to say38) ‘deal with’ or ‘handle’ this dark chapter in Canadian
history.
Litigation, whether individual or, in this case, collective (class action),
frames the legal issues and calls the attention of the defendant(s) (in
this case, the government and the churches) and the public to the fact
that a claim has been made in a public forum with demand for remedial
action. Lawsuits serve the function of clarifying legal claims, asserting
demands for redress, and in the course of discovery and information
exchanges, often produce the evidence necessary to prove claims
(as long as the legal claims are already recognized in law). In the case
of the Indian Residential Schools litigation, these functions were per-
formed, with information produced and enough successful verdicts
for large amounts of money to provide the motivation to seek what
is known in aggregate litigation as a ‘global settlement.’ That is, the
Canadian government and the churches feared economic loss and
the continued anger and resentment of various parts of the polity
(including both First Nations peoples and others who both acknowl-
edged or denied the claims). That the mediation which resulted in the
ultimate settlement was achieved is a momentous event for Canada
and for legal history and for the legal profession, but it is not without its
lessons and cautions. I comment here on a few, based on my work as
a conflict resolution and legal profession scholar and mediation practi-
tioner.
At its best, the Indian Residential Schools Settlement is one exemplar
of what I have come to call a ‘transformative moment’ in the develop-
ment of the legal system, a further evolution from the days of trial by fire
or ordeal to adversarial (or inquisitorial) trial and now to more hybrid
38 As a dispute ‘resolution’ scholar and practitioner, I have long refused the phrase ‘reso-
lution’ as descriptive of our field. Some disputes and conflicts can never be fully re-
solved, and this is clearly one of those. There is no way to make many of the victims
whole; we cannot bring back those who have died or suffered enormously from these
grievous wrongs. Instead, what we do in the conflict resolution field is try to handle
conflicts and disputes, by acknowledging them, confronting them, talking about
them, and then looking for many different methods and modes for doing something
about them for those in conflict and dispute as well as for those affected by conflicts
and disputes (e.g. children, subsequent generations, etc).
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forms of justice,39 which include mediation, multi-party dispute resolu-
tion,40 transitional justice, restorative justice, and more responsive and
inclusive forms of justice.41 Injured parties can request and often receive
remedies or outcomes not available in conventional litigation, which
focuses on the past, not the future. So modern developments in restor-
ative justice permit, indeed encourage, apologies, commitments by the
parties to undertake changes in their future relationship, and in some
cases, particular actions or recompense (or services provided). In addi-
tion, restorative justice processes often involve whole communities, not
just the litigation parties, and are themselves often derived from Indige-
nous, local, and alternative dispute resolution processes.
If our conventional adversarial system requires plaintiffs and defen-
dants (the latter the doers of bad acts to the plaintiff) to prove their du-
ties and obligations and failures to each other by proof and evidence,
then they may have a remedy prescribed by legal principles of liability –
in these cases, damages for abuse, physical, and mental harm. But in the
Indian school litigation we also see the limits of the traditional adversar-
ial model –many of the doers of bad acts (or non-feasance as well as mal-
feasance) are no longer with us and many, if not most, of the victims are
also now gone.42 How do we remedy past harms to those currently living
who continue to suffer from those harms but cannot confront or claim
against the individuals responsible? How do we remedy the group
harms? And although our modern legal system has, for the most part,
abolished the doctrines of sovereign or charitable immunity, the institu-
tional wrongdoers – the government and the churches – would, at com-
mon law, have been immune from suit for the policies they developed
and implemented.43 If we now allow claims against governments and
churches and charities in particular settings, we still do not formally or
39 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Is the Adversary System Really Dead? Dilemmas of Legal Eth-
ics as Legal Institutions and Roles Evolve’ (2004) 57 Current Legal Problems 85,
online: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/clp/57.1.85>.
40 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ed, Complex Dispute Resolution (Foundations, Multi-Party and
Democratic Deliberation and Decision Making, and International Dispute Resolution) (Alder-
shot, UK: Ashgate Press, 2012).
41 Phillipe Nonet, Philip Selznick, & Robert Kagan, Law and Society in Transition: Toward
Responsive Law (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).
42 Others in this issue have reviewed how the structures and requirements of our com-
mon law and adversarial system have worked together to restrict liability through doc-
trine; see e.g. Moran, supra note 9 (proof requirements); Roach, supra note 10
(procedural and ethical requirements of the Canadian and most other Anglo adver-
sarial legal systems); see also Trevor CW Farrow, ‘Residential Schools Litigation and
the Legal Profession’ (2014) 64:4 UTLJ [present issue].
43 See Moran, supra note 9, for discussion of doctrinal charitable and sovereign immu-
nity issues.
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legally recognize some of the claims actually experienced as harms by
the victims – loss of family (consortium?), loss of language, loss of cul-
ture, loss of group belongingness. So the lawsuits are useful in framing
new categories of claims as lawyers transform the narrative expressions
of their client’s stories and pain into legally cognizable claims44 which
still have not been fully accepted by the formal legal system.
To the extent, however, that participation of First Nation representa-
tives, as claimants, lawyers, mediators, and judges, allowed the expression
of and demand for recognition of claims beyond those formally recog-
nized by the legal system, the mediation of actual claims with multiple
parties (not just two sides to the dispute45) permitted the development
of more than conventional compensation – some recognition of more
Indigenous forms of remedies in apologies, truth commissions, reconcili-
ation, and commemoration events and activities.
As a process of conflict resolution, mediation creates room for more a
direct expression of claims, narratives, and human desires, including de-
mands for justice and principles, and it provides a forum where feelings
can be recognized and demands for moral, religious, and ethical atten-
tion to the issues be confronted (as well as authorizing the statement but
not adjudication of legal claims). Mediation allows (at great risk and
with difficulty, requiring a different form of professional training and
skill) more direct confrontation and discussion among and between
those involved in the claims than do formal rules of evidence and testi-
mony in court, but it also promises more direct understanding, transfor-
mation, and mutual knowledge.46 Mediation of all kinds of disputes,
both in the courts, criminal and civil, and outside (including in the
family, workplace, commercial, labour, business, diplomacy), has now
44 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘The Transformation of Disputes by Lawyers: What the Dis-
pute Paradigm Does and Does Not Tell Us’ (1985) 2 Journal of Dispute Resolution 25.
45 I have argued in many essays and articles that our conventional adversarial system has
too often dichotomized legal conflicts into two sides, when, in reality, many conflicts
involve more than one issue and more than two parties; see Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
‘The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Post-Modern, Multi-cultural World’
(1996) 38 Wm & Mary L Rev 5. Stuart Hampshire, in his Tanner lectures, has opined
that the Anglo-American adversarial system of conflict resolution, ‘audi alterum partum’
(hear the other side), is one of the most notable of human achievements where, when
we cannot agree on the substantive good, we might agree on the processes for resol-
ving our differences; see Stuart Hampshire, Justice Is Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2000). While I applaud the notion that conflict resolution is among
our most significant human skills (and sciences), our postmodern world requires us to
hear all sides to a conflict, not just two; see e.g. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘The Lawyer’s
Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy’ (2004/5) 5 Nevada Law Review 347.
46 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lela Love, & Andrea Schneider, Mediation: Practice, Policy
and Ethics, 2d ed (New York: Wolters Kluwer Aspen, 2013).
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inspired the development of alternative processes in a wide variety of set-
tings including mass harms, post-conflict transitional justice, criminal jus-
tice, and human rights violations.47 As in the Indian Schools Settlement,
different forms of restorative, restitutionary, apologetic, and compensa-
tory processes have now been used to document truth (e.g. the many
truth and reconciliation commissions in a variety of post-conflict set-
tings48), offer apologies, reintegrate offenders into the community,
grant forgiveness, prescribe future-oriented restitutionary behaviour,
adapt and recraft contingent outcomes, and revisit the agreed-on terms
of any agreement. In short, new forms of restorative or transitional jus-
tice are evolutionary developments supplementing and adding to our
more conventional justice system. Such forms of justice, providing
both permanent institutions and more temporary ones, allow different
rules of engagement (narrative without cross-examination, evidence
without formal rules, and more direct communication, often with profes-
sional intercessions) and different outcomes (not only damage awards
or injunctions, but apologies, commitments to future undertakings,
and the creation of new monitoring, counselling, health, or educational
programs). Most importantly, these forms of justice can provide both
individual and group opportunities for expression of harm, acknowl-
edgement of guilt, confession, apology, and forgiveness. The Indian Res-
idential Schools Settlement, by allocating funds for commemoration and
truth commission activities, demonstrates just how other forms of (more
responsive) justice can be tailored to particular situations.
Yet the processes of restorative justice in general and the Indian Resi-
dential Schools Settlement in particular are not without dangers and
problems as well. Authenticity of participation is essential if apologies
and forgiveness are to be taken seriously. Critics of the South African
truth and reconciliation process noted that many of the key actors – for
example, the lawyers and judges who enforced the apartheid regime –
did not fully participate.49 Earlier efforts to involve Indigenous peoples
47 Andrea Kupfer Schneider, ‘The Intersection of Dispute System Design and Transi-
tional Justice’ (2009)14 Harv Negot L Rev 289.
48 Hayner, supra note 37; Robert I Rotberg & Dennis Thompson, Truth v Justice: The
Morality of Truth Commissions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Des-
mond Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness (New York: Doubleday, 1999); Mark Free-
man, Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2006); James Gibson, Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Resolve a Di-
vided Nation? (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004); Jane Sromseth, Accounting
for Atrocities: National and International Responses (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2003).
49 David Dyzenhaus, Judging the Judges – Judging Ourselves: Truth, Reconciliation and Apart-
heid Legal Orders (Oxford: Hart, 2003).
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in Canadian law making have been similarly criticized.50 The pre-
Settlement ADR process (and some of the language) in the final settle-
ment document reflects the co-opting of alternative processes by conven-
tional legal language and requirements – what seemed alternative
instead required conventional proof at a hearing and the process was
considered by many to be over-professionalized and legalized, even
when hearing officers were not lawyers or were First Nations people.51
The danger of co-optation by legal concepts and legal language of even
the most alternative processes remains a danger in many efforts to craft
tailored processes for particular situations and has been noted by some
critics of the Canadian Indian Schools Settlement process, dominated by
the Canadian legal establishment.52 The same has been notable in the
use of ADR by many formal court systems.53 Individualized hearings
intended to provide compensation for those specifically injured have de-
volved into conventional, legal evidentiary hearings, inflicting the pain
of reliving abuse on rape victims, who often complain that trials become
a second rape, and demonstrating just how difficult it is to truly change a
legal process.
In Australia, the path-breaking case of Mabo v Queensland (1992)54 re-
cognized, for the first time, the legitimacy of land claims of Aboriginal
people, but in the twenty years since, new legislation and the reassertion
of conventional colonial conceptions of proof of land claims has not
much altered the landscape. Aboriginal critics in both Australia and Can-
ada continue to lament the failure of the colonials to really engage in
true dialogue and work towards understanding the different conceptions
of justice and meaning of those communities.55 True healing and for-
giveness cannot be commanded. Critics claim that postcolonial govern-
ments still seek closure (whether of compensation amounts or land title)
of conventionally framed legal claims and are not willing to reopen or
50 Jula Hughes, ‘Instructive Past: Lessons from the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peo-
ples for the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission on Indian Reservation
Schools’ (2011) 27 CJLS 101 [Hughes], critiquing aspects of the Royal Commission
on Aboriginal Peoples and some aspects of the Indian Schools Settlement and the
truth and reconciliation process.
51 See Regan, supra note 6 at 141–2, suggesting that Aboriginal desires for healing were
co-opted by the needs of the colonial government for closure and for limiting da-
mages and compensation.
52 Hughes, supra note 50.
53 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: The Law
of ADR’ (1991) 19 Fla St L Rev 1; but cf. Julie MacFarlane, The New Lawyer: How Settle-
ment Is Transforming the Practice of Law (Vancouver: University of British Columbia
Press, 2008).
54 175 CLR 1 (the doctrine of terra nullius does not apply to Australian land ownership).
55 See e.g. Maddison & Brigg, supra note 7.
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revisit earlier settlements. Others are concerned that even commemora-
tive events and truth and reconciliation commissions do not engage the
whole society. Prime Minister Stephen Harper apologized at a brief ses-
sion in Parliament in 2008; Australia had a full Apology Day, with expec-
tations that the entire nation would participate in public places; the
United States has yet to offer any formal recognition of the many harms it
has inflicted on its Indigenous population.56 Yet, despite these very public
and symbolic events, underlying resentment may continue. How can such
issues be resolved and the different perspectives be reconciled if eco-
nomic, educational, health access, and other conditions that transcend
the legal issues of the residential school cases are not ameliorated?
Thus, it can be said that the Canadian Indian Residential Schools Set-
tlement Agreement has been momentous, in many respects. It arises
from what is probably the first truth and reconciliation process within a
nation, not in connection with a violent ongoing conflict or civil war,
and one of the largest compensatory settlements by a former colonial
power (including both governmental and religious bodies); it acknowl-
edges wrong doing and attempts to rectify some harms through both
material and more non-material acts, with the desire to correct, account
for, and change a nation’s history and its relationship to its first citizens
and inhabitants. Yet the settlement is both honoured and criticized for
what it has accomplished and what it has not. Aboriginal life in Canada,
as in much of the rest of the colonized world, is still distorted by poverty,
dislocation, abuse, alcoholism, health and education deficiencies, ex-
periences of inequality and discrimination, and ambivalence about rela-
tions with the larger polity.
At the same time, there are many valuable lessons to be learned from
as well as questions still to be resolved about both the process and the
substantive settlement itself:
1. Litigation may be necessary, but not sufficient, to deal with mass
(group) harms. Litigation frames issues, publicizes bad acts, generates
information, and provides the initial framework for legal liability.
2. Legal liability is not enough for acknowledging deeper moral and
historical claims. To the extent that legal doctrines (such as proof
and evidentiary requirements, legal fees rules, immunity, and the
limitations of remedial imaginations and powers57) limit what courts
56 Although, interestingly, when I was recently in Australia, the claim was made that at
least the United States had signed many treaties with its Aboriginal people (some
more honoured in the breach than not, but at least there was open and public negoti-
ation and public documentation of claims, relationships, and some expectations!).
57 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Struc-
ture of Problem-Solving’ (1984) 31 UCLA L Rev 754, for my original argument that
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can do, litigation may be inappropriate for the handling, manage-
ment, and resolution of complex, multi-party, long-term, and com-
plex social, political, and legal issues.
3. Even collective (class actions, consolidations) or other forms of
aggregate litigation58 may be inadequate for the resolution of com-
plex group and individually based claims that rely on both individual
proof and collectively or group-based or experienced harm. Some
claims and harms require more complex hybridized treatment.
4. Litigation may be a starting point, but is inadequate for the recogni-
tion of ‘harms’ experienced that are not yet recognized as legal
claims (e.g. loss of language/culture/family/group).
5. Conventionally trained lawyers and judges may be limited in how
they conceive of legal claims and harms and be unable to enter into
the subjective experience of those who experience harms and claims
not yet recognized by formal legal systems. As some have noted, the
Indian Residential Schools Settlement is still western and legal in
conception – a settlement of lawsuits and legal issues, not the reinte-
gration and healing of communities.
6. Those harmed in such group/mass settings may have a great variety
of experiences that cannot easily be fit into legal remedies; thus
more flexible, tailored, and ‘bespoke’ processes (and outcomes)
may be necessary to deal with the human variation in injurious ex-
periences.
7. Process pluralism (drawing on meditational, restorative justice as
well as litigation) may be a better way to conceive of managing such
complex claims. There may be preferred orders for such processes:
litigation to frame claims; negotiation and mediation to explore
deeply felt needs, interests, preferences, applicable principles, moti-
vations, emotional, group, ethical, religious, and other concerns in
order to search for a variety of different kinds of outcomes and solu-
tion. Some processes may need to be public for educational and
judicial (justice-seeking) purposes; others may require some confi-
dentiality, to provide protection for individuals, and to explore
potentially controversial solutions.
8. Group and mass claims require a menu of choices for processes and
outcomes – some of those who have been injured will want public
hearings; others will prefer privacy and secrecy to reveal what hap-
pened to them and to seek accountability from those who caused
courts (and the shadows of their rulings that create bargaining endowments) have lim-
ited remedial powers to resolve many legal and human problems.
58 See American Law Institute, Principles of Aggregate Litigation (Philadelphia, PA: ALI,
2012).
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harm. Some will want compensation; others will want apologies.
Some will be willing to forgive (if not forget); others never will. One
size will not fit all. Our legal system requires more diverse processes
than binary legal hearings with win/lose outcomes. The Indian Resi-
dential Schools Settlement has at least attempted to create a menu
of some choice and differentiated processes for different purposes.
9. Those who engage in the legal work affecting large groups of people
with great injury will require training and skills which may be quite
different from or additional to conventional legal training – negotia-
tion, mediation, problem solving, responsive dialogue, dispute system
design,59 counselling, healing, and non-legal forms of communica-
tion. It may be that alternative or more appropriate forms of justice
will require differently skilled professionals at different stages of these
processes.
10. Complex, historically based, and group claims may require processes
that are more susceptible to change and modification (‘contingent’
solutions) than conventional legal processes provide for. This is part
of the development of the newer legal processes of deliberative
democracy and consensus building as methods of managing and
handling modern complex legal (and human) disputes that do not
lend themselves so easily to final resolutions. (Consider here envi-
ronmental, scientific, medical, family and some business issues,
where change may affect resolution, so that re-opener clauses and
other opportunities for re-negotiation are required.) What do we do
when new information comes to light, during, or even after, the res-
olution of some claims?
11. Finally, when do seemingly sui generis claims of harms, like the often
repeated (US, Australia, Canada, UK and other perpetrators of simi-
lar harms) practices of abuse, require their own particular, culturally
specific processes, with a mixture of legal, historical, and emotional
healing, with both backward-looking and forward-facing concerns?
Will it ever be possible to plan for and design such processes in
advance or to use the similar processes in different settings, or must
such mass and group and culturally specific claims always be de-
signed sui generis?
It is my view that the Indian Residential Schools Settlement demon-
strated use of a variety of legal and non-legal processes that attempted,
in an imperfect but very human way, to face up to a shameful period
in the national history of Canada and the equally shameful human
59 Nancy Rogers, Robert Bordone, Frank Sander, & Craig McEwen, Designing Systems and
Processes for Managing Disputes (New York: Wolters Kluwer Aspen, 2013).
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behaviour of most colonial powers. If we can learn anything from what
has been accomplished thus far, it is that human frailty and bad beha-
viour evolves and changes over time. As we now acknowledge the wrongs
we have done, we must continue to explore and experiment with new
ways to attempt to reconcile and reintegrate ourselves with each other.
For me, this means that law, lawyers, and legal processes will have to
evolve to improve our relations with each other, to enable us to really
hear the needs and demands of others, like First Nations peoples, in
their own terms and with their own values, and to create new forms of
process and new remedial ideas to reach new understandings of each
other and true healing, especially, as here, where we can never achieve
full compensation and remediation.
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